But how does it come about that while the I think gives Kant a genuine phenomenal starting-point, he cannot exploit it ontologically, and has to fall back on the subjectthat is to say, something *substantial*? The I is not just an I think, but an I think something. And does not Kant himself keep on stressing that the I remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them?For Kant, however, these representations are the empirical, which is accompanied by the Ithe appearances to which the I clings. Kant nowhere shows the kind of Being of this clinging and accompanying. At bottom, however, their kind of Being is understood as the constant Being-present-at-hand of the I along with its representations. Kant has indeed avoided cutting the I adrift from thinking; but he has done so without starting with the I think itself in its full essential content as an I think something, and above all, without seeing what is ontologically presupposed in taking the I think something as a basic characteristic of the Self. For even the I think something is not definite enough ontologically as a starting-point, because the something remains indefinite. If by this something we understand an entity *within-the-world*, then it tacitly implies that the *world* has been presupposed; and this very phenomenon of the world co-determines the state of Being of the I, if indeed it is to be possible for the I to be something like an I think something. In saying I, I have in view the entity which in each case I am as an I-am-in-a-world. Kant did not see the phenomenon of the world, and was consistent enough to keep the representations apart from the *a priori* content of the I think. But as a consequence the I was again forced back to an *isolated* subject, accompanying representations in a way which is ontologically quite indefinite.*In saying I, Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world*. But does saying I in the everyday manner have *itself* in view *as* being-in-the-world [*in-der-Welt-seiend*]? Here we must make a distinction. When saying I, Dasein surely has in view the entity which, in every case, it is itself. The everyday interpretation of the Self, however, has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the world with which it is concerned. When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it *fails to see* itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which it is itself. And this holds especially for the basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world."from_Being and Time_. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, pp. 367-370